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THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED IN A NEW MEXICO
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION: WALTA V. GALLEGOS
LAW FIRM, P.C.
CAMILLE ROMERO*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C.,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals
addressed, as a matter of first impression in New Mexico, the nature of the fiduciary
duties owed among shareholders in a closely held corporation. The significance of
Walta is its practical import, since it defined the standards that must be followed by
shareholders in New Mexico closely held corporations. As a result, Walta is likely
to impact many individuals and corporate entities throughout New Mexico.
Shareholders in closely held corporations will be bound by the default fiduciary duty
standards established in Walta unless they expressly choose other standards of
conduct.
This note will describe and discuss the factual particularities and procedural
history of the Walta case,2 the historical setting of the case,3 and the New Mexico
appellate court's analysis of the issues presented in Walta.4 It will examine the
court's rationale5 and will conclude with a discussion of the implications stemming
from the Walta decision.6
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Walta arose when Mary Walta, a minority shareholder in a New Mexico closely
held corporation, brought suit against the corporation itself, the Gallegos Law Firm,
P.C. (Firm), and its majority shareholder, J.E. Gallegos (Gallegos).7 Walta joined
the Firm as an attorney-shareholder in January 1990,' and by November 1994, the
Finn consisted of five attorney-shareholders. 9 Despite some measure of financial
success in 1993 and 1994, the Firm experienced sporadic financial pressures during
that time, resulting in conflict among the shareholders.'0 Walta, in particular, "had
spoken in opposition to [the Firm's] acceptance of certain contingency fee cases"
and its resultant indebtedness on the Firm's line of credit.t" Gallegos responded to
* Class of 2004, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank Ernest and Theresa
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1. 2002-NMCA-015, 40 P.3d 449, cert. denied, 41 P.3d 345 (2002).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part V.
7. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 26, 40 P.3d at 455.
8. Id. 4,40 P.3d at 451.
9. Id. The shareholders consisted of Gallegos, Walta, Michael Condon, David Sandoval, and Glenn Theriot.
Id. At that time, Gallegos was the majority shareholder, owning fifty percent of the Firm's stock. Id. The four
minority shareholders owned varying percentages of the remaining stock. Id.
10. Id. 5,40P.3dat451.
11. Id. The court further noted that "[o]n a number of occasions, Walta told Gallegos that the manner in
which [the Firm] accepted contingency fee cases should be reformed." Id.
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Walta's concerns with annoyance, asserting that his knowledge and experience
made him more qualified to evaluate the caseload and manage the firm. 2
In early November of 1994, Gallegos began hinting at his intention to phase out
of the active practice of law within the next five years. 3 Shortly thereafter, Gallegos
circulated a memorandum to each shareholder detailing a proposal to restructure the
Firm. 14 The memorandum proposed that Gallegos could purchase all of the other
shareholders' stock, leaving him as the sole shareholder of the Firm. 5 The proposal
specifically stated that, for the buyout procedure, "stock will be surrendered and
valued in accordance with the corporate by-laws as of December 31, 1994 and your
employment terminated at that time."' 16 Gallegos also suggested, as an alternative,
that he could sell all of his stock to the four other shareholders and subsequently
depart from the Firm.'7
Walta believed that the memorandum meant that she was being fired from the
Firm and that she had no control over her impending departure. 8 In addition to her
apparently certain termination, Walta was concerned about the valuation of her stock
under the terms proposed in the memorandum. 9 Walta and Gallegos met several
12. Id. This initial dispute between Gallegos and Walta developed into a larger rift as time progressed. Id.
6, 40 P.3d at 451. "Walta felt Gallegos often singled her out as the source of his irritation." Id.
13. Id. 7,40 P.3d at 452.
14. Id. 8, 40 P.3d at 452.
15. Id.
16. Id. 1 10, 40 P.3d at 452. When determining the surrender value of a departing shareholder's stock, the
Firm's corporate by-laws differentiated between vested and non-vested stock. Id. Walta's 2000 shares consisted of
"both vested and non-vested stock." Id. The Firm's bylaws stated that, for non-vested stock, "the shareholder [was
to] be paid the equivalent of the purchase price of the stock or no less than 'the exact cost of the stock to him or
her."' Id. Since "Walta and the other shareholders had paid $10 per share" of stock, that would be the surrender
value assigned to their non-vested stock. Id. Because of her tenure at the Firm, Walta believed that half (1000
shares) of her stock had vested, the value of which was more difficult to assess. Id. V 10, 17, 40 P.3d at 452-53.
According to the Firm's by-laws, shares "became 'vested' only if [the] shareholder had at least three years of
employment commencing from 'the date that he or she first acquired shares in the corporation."' Id. 11, 40 P.3d
at 452. Once the stock became vested, a departing shareholder surrendering the stock was to receive the "present
book value.. as of the effective date of termination" for his or her vested stock. Id. Under the by-laws, if the present
book value computation produced "a negative value, or a value of less than [the acquisition price of] $10 per share,
the [surrender] value of the vested stock would" be equal to the $10 acquisition price paid by the shareholders. Id.
17. Id. 8,40 P.3d at 452.
18. Id. 22, 40 P.3d at 454.
19. Id. 12,40 P.3d at 453. However, when the Firm's shareholders met on December 15, 1994, to discuss
the proposed buyout, "Walta did not raise any [of her] concerns about [the] valuation of.. .stock or about the
termination of her employment," despite the fact that she had concluded that the relevant proposals violated the
standing by-laws of the firm. Id. U 9, 12, 40 P.3d at 452-53.
On March 28, 1995, Walta had obtained a copy of a letter given to attorney-shareholder Theriot by
Gallegos. Id. 17, 40 P.3d at 453. "[That] letter.. .stated that under the 'present book value' formula in the by-
laws..., [vested] stock had a 'negative value' on [the operative] December 31, 1994 [date], and therefore would only
be valued at.. .[the acquisition price of] $10 per share." Id. However, "Gallegos did not disclose that in arriving at
a 'negative value' for [the Firm's vested] stock, he had omitted certain accounts receivable from the calculation
because he thought" that they did not meet the collectible accounts receivable definition contained in the Firm's by-
laws. Id. At trial, "Gallegos testified [that] he did not use actual 'collectible accounts receivable' as stated in the by-
laws definition of 'present book value' because [the Firm's] business practices did not and had never included
preparation of a report that provided such information." Id. 18, 40 P.3d at 454. Therefore, "Gallegos opined that
it would have required considerable time and subjective judgment to collect information on accounts receivables
and determine whether they were collectible" under the Firm's by-laws. Id. Gallegos testified that he had calculated
the value of Walta's stock using the method that had been employed previously by the attorney-shareholders during
"the only other time a shareholder with vested stock had left [the Firm]." Id. 19, 40 P.3d at 454. "Although that
procedure did not comply with the letter of the [Firm's] by-laws, all the [shareholders], including Walta, had agreed
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times to discuss various aspects of the buyout.20 During those meetings, Walta failed
to voice her concerns about her impending termination or the valuation of her
stock.2' It was only on Walta's last day of employment that she informed Gallegos,
by way of a letter, that she objected to the terms of the proposal.22
Walta believed that Gallegos's actual intention was to convert the Firm into a
corporation with a single shareholder-himself. 23 She subsequently sued "the [Firm]
and Gallegos for money damages, alleging six separate claims for relief,, 24 the most
relevant being the breach of fiduciary duties. 25 "The jury found in favor of
Walta .... and against Gallegos... for 'breach of his fiduciary duties with respect to
the [Firm's] shareholder agreement and to.. .Walta. '''26 "The jury awarded Walta
compensatory damages" for the value of her stock "in the amount of $62,550 against
both [the Firm] and Gallegos. 27 The jury also awarded punitive damages "against
Gallegos individually, in the amount of $100,000.,,21
Gallegos appealed only the punitive damages award to the New Mexico Court of
Appeals.29 He based his appeal on two general assertions. First, he claimed that
Walta's "fiduciary duty claims should not have been submitted to the jury at all
because if the proper definition of the fiduciary duty was applied, there was no
question he fulfilled his obligations."" Second, Gallegos asserted that, "in the wake
to it" at the time. Id. As a result of those calculations, Gallegos determined that the total valuation for 'both
[Walta's] vested and non-vested stock [was] $20,000-the amount Walta had paid for the stock." id. 20, 40 P.3d
at 454.
20. Id. 15, 40 P.3d at 453. Several of the meetings involved Walta, Gallegos, and the Firm's accountant;
during these meetings, year-end firm finances, client file transition, and pending cases were discussed. Id.
21. Id. The work environment at the Firm during this period was very strained, with limited communication
and continued disagreement between Walta and Gallegos. Id. 16, 40 P.3d at 453. Walta had to pressure Gallegos
to allow her access to the Firm's monthly financial statements and was excluded from some client presentations,
despite access and involvement by shareholders Condon and Sandoval. Id. Further, Gallegos did not offer Walta
any contract work during the transition period nor did he assist Walta in finding another job. Id.
22. Id. 22, 40 P.3d at 454. Specifically, Walta stated that she believed that "[her] termination of
employment... [was] wrongful and without cause." Id. She also stated that she disputed both the valuation of her
stock and the December 31, 1994, valuation date and had thus retained legal counsel. Id.
23. Id. 23, 40 P.3d at 454. Walta also learned that "contrary to [his] prior representations that" the Firm
would consist "of only himself and [another] young associate" after the buyout, Gallegos had actually offered each
of the existing attomey-shareholders, with the exception of Walta, continued employment with the Firm. Id.
24. Id. 26, 40 P.3d at 455. The claims were (1) "breach of employment contract," (2) "breach of obligations
owed to shareholders under the shareholder agreement," (3) "breach of fiduciary duties," (4) retaliatory discharge,
(5) promissory estoppel, and (6) "intentional interference with contractual relationship." Id. The Firm and Gallegos
then filed a "counterclaim against Walta asserting malicious abuse of process." Id. "The trial court directed a verdict
against Walta on her retaliatory discharge and promissory estoppel claims." Id. 27, 40 P.3d at 455. The court also
directed a verdict "against Gallegos on his malicious abuse of process claim." Id. "Thereafter, Gallegos and the Firm
withdrew all.. .remaining counterclaims." Id.
25. Id. 26, 40 P.3d at 455.
26. Id. 28, 40 P.3d at 455.
27. ld. "At trial, experts for Gallegos, [the Firm], and Walta had the advantage of hindsight in totaling the
Firm's accounts actually collected after Walta left [the Firm]." Id. 21, 40 P.3d at 454. Gallegos's own expert
concluded that the value of Walta's vested stock as of December 31, 1994, even using a conservative measure, was
actually $41,275, not the $20,000 calculated by Gallegos. Id. The jury ultimately relied on the amount calculated
by Gallegos's expert in arriving at the $62,550 figure for the total worth of Walta's stock. Id.
28. Id. 28,40 P.3d at 455. "Walta [had] requested punitive damages against both [the Firm and Gallegos]."
Id.
29. Id. 29,40 P.3d at 455.
30. Id. "As a backstop [to that claim], [Gallegos] also argue[d] that the fiduciary duty instruction given was
incomplete and did not provide sufficient guidance to the jury." Id.
Winter 2004]
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of the jury's verdict against Walta on her breach of employment contract and
interference with contract claims, there [was] no evidence of the kind of culpable
state of mind necessary to support punitive damages."3
The appellate court held that, as the majority shareholder of the Firm, "Gallegos
owed Walta a fiduciary duty in his efforts to restructure [the Firm], including the
purchase of her... stock."32 More specifically, the court held that Gallegos had the
"fiduciary obligation to disclose material facts affecting the value of the stock which
[were] known to [him] by virtue of his position, but not known to the selling
shareholder. ' 33 After recognizing the existence of such a duty, the court went on to
define the scope of the fiduciary duty in New Mexico closely held corporations as
being "similar to that owed by directors, officers, and shareholders to the corpora-
tion itself; that is, loyalty, good faith, inherent fairness, and the obligation not to
profit at the expense of the corporation."' The court concluded that Gallegos's
actions, as a whole, constituted a breach of his fiduciary duties and therefore
affirmed the jury's verdict and award of punitive damages.3"
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to Walta, New Mexico courts had not previously addressed the fiduciary
duties owed in New Mexico closely held corporations; thus, this case established a
new precedent. Since the New Mexico Court of Appeals had no direct precedent on
which to base its analysis of the issue, the court looked to other sources for
guidance. Specifically, the court relied on two main sources for its analysis of the
fiduciary duties owed in closely held corporations: New Mexico partnership law36
and caselaw from other jurisdictions that had previously addressed the issues raised
in Walta.3
7
The fiduciary duties owed in New Mexico partnerships have been statutorily
defined.38 In New Mexico, the only fiduciary duties partners owe are the duty of
loyalty and the duty of care.39 Partners owe those duties to both the partnership itself
31. Id.
32. Id. 38, 40 P.3d at 451. The court also held that "breach of [the] fiduciary duty [could] be asserted as
an individual claim separate from the remedies available under [New Mexico] statutory corporate law for oppressive
conduct." Id. (citing Fate v. Owens, 2001-NMCA-040, 1 23-25, 27 P.3d 990).
33. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 45,40 P.3d at 458.
34. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 141,40 P.3d at 458 (citing Dilaconi v. New Cal. Corp., 97 N.M. 782, 788,
643 P.2d 1234, 1240 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (Mass.
1975)).
35. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 9166,40 P.3d at 462. In reaching its holding, the appellate court addressed and
denied Gallegos's arguments regarding the adequacy of the jury instructions as to the scope of the fiduciary duties
and the absence of the requisite culpable mental state. As the focus of this note is the court's holding with regard
to fiduciary duties in closely held corporations, discussion of the procedural specifics regarding those arguments
will be limited. See id. 9 49-66, 40 P.3d at 459-62.
36. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 54-1A-401(f), (h)-(j) (1996).
37. See, e.g., Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 171 (Miss. 1989); Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328
N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976); TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Berreman v. West Publ'g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 367
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
38. NMSA 1978, § 54-1A-404 (1996).
39. Id. According to the statute,
A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is limited to the following:
1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit or benefit derived
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and to other partners.4" New Mexico caselaw regarding partnership fiduciary duties
is well developed, providing ready precedent for subsequent courts examining
fiduciary duty issues.4' Thus, the New Mexico Court of Appeals had both statutory
language and caselaw from its own jurisdiction from which to derive part of its
analysis.
However, the New Mexico appellate court also relied heavily on authority from
other jurisdictions in formulating its holding.42 Prior to Walta, several other states
had examined the issue of fiduciary duties in the context of closely held corpora-
tions."3 The appellate court examined several of the various approaches taken by
other jurisdictions44 and formulated an integrated approach to defining the fiduciary
duties owed in New Mexico closely held corporations. That approach established
the existence of the fiduciary duty owed in New Mexico closely held corporations
while preserving generally established business principles.
IV. RATIONALE AND ANALYSIS
In formulating the scope of the fiduciary duty owed by shareholders in closely
held corporations in New Mexico, the New Mexico Court of Appeals was
essentially working with a blank slate. Walta was a matter of first impression and
New Mexico caselaw related to closely held corporations, even generally, is quite
limited.4' Therefore, the court could have taken any number of approaches in
evaluating the fiduciary duty owed in closely held corporations: it could have
specifically denied the existence of such a duty and left shareholders up to their own
devices, created a novel approach to the fiduciary duty, adopted an already existing
concept of the fiduciary duty, or embraced a combination of several existing
formulations on the fiduciary duty. The latter was the approach taken by the New
Mexico Court of Appeals.
The court's analysis began where it should, by examining existing New Mexico
caselaw to see if there was any precedent related to the issues presented in Walta.46
The court found that the few New Mexico cases involving closely held corporations
by the partner in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or derived from a use
by the partner of partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity;
2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up of the partnership
business as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership; and 3) to refrain
from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership business before the
dissolution of the partnership.
Id. at § 404(b). Additionally, "[a] partner's duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and
winding up of the partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless
conduct, intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law." Id. § 404(c).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Homestake Mining Co. v. Mid-Continent Exploration Co., 282 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1960); Levy
v. Disharoon, 106 N.M. 699,749 P.2d 84 (1988); Fate v. Owens, 2001-NMCA-040, 27 P.3d 476; Bassett v. Bassett,
110 N.M. 559, 798 P.2d 160 (1990).
42. See, e.g., Fought, 543 So.2d at 167; Donohue, 328 N.E.2d at 505; Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 657; TSC Indus.
Inc., 426 U.S. at 438; Berreman, 615 N.W.2d at 362.
43. See, e.g., Fought, 543 So.2d at 167; Donohue, 328 N.E.2d at 505; Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 657; TSC Indus.,
Inc., 426 U.S. at 438; Berreman, 615 N.W.2d at 362.
44. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, [ 32-37,40 P.3d at 456-57.
45. Id. [31, 40 P.3d at 456.
46. Id.
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did not address the fiduciary duties owed therein. 47 For example, in Schwartzman
v. Schwartzman Packing Co.,48 a 1983 New Mexico case, the New Mexico Supreme
Court had addressed the common law and statutory duty to allow examination of
corporate books but did not expand its discussion into other areas of shareholders'
duties.49 In McCauley v. Tom McCauley and Son, Inc.,° the New Mexico Court of
Appeals "examined the concept of 'oppressive conduct' sufficient to support judicial
intervention in corporate affairs under the New Mexico corporation statute in effect
at that time."" While McCauley was useful to the Walta court "for its general
approach and observations about the characteristic features of a close corpora-
tion... it [did] not address the idea of an enforceable fiduciary duty between
shareholders outside.. .of the corporation statute's provision for relief from illegal,
oppressive or fraudulent conduct. 52 In conducting its examination of prior caselaw,
the Walta court ascertained that it was not bound to a particular approach under
existing New Mexico precedent.
The court then began the second phase of its analysis by setting forth the
traditional characteristics of a closely held corporation. Citing a Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court opinion,53 the New Mexico court identified a closely held
corporation as "one typified by: (1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready
market for corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in
the management, direction and operations of the corporation. 54 The court then
noted that the characteristics of a closely held corporation could be abused to enable
majority shareholders to take advantage of minority shareholders.5 By using
oppressive tactics such as "refusing to declare dividends, draining of corporate
earnings in the form of exorbitant salaries and bonuses paid to majority sharehold-
ers, denying minority shareholders corporate offices and employment, and selling
corporate assets to majority shareholders at reduced prices," majority shareholders
could subordinate minority shareholder interests in the closely held corporation. 6
Similarly, the traditional characteristics of a closely held corporation make minority
shareholders vulnerable to the "freeze out" or "squeeze out" devices sometimes used
by majority shareholders.57
The device used by courts to combat such tactics has been the recognition of a
fiduciary duty owed by the majority shareholders to minority shareholders. 8 Some
appellate decisions have expanded the fiduciary duty rule and held that the fiduciary
47. Id.
48. 99 N.M. 436, 659 P.2d 888 (1983).
49. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 31, 40 P.3d at 456 (citing Schwartzman, 99 N.M. at 439, 659 P.2d at 891).
50. 104 N.M. 523, 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
51. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 31, 40 P.3d at 456 (citing McCauley, 104 N.M. at 529, 724 P.2d at 338;
NMSA 1978, § 53-16-16(A)(1)(b) (1967)).
52. Id. (citing McCauley, 104 N.M. at 526-29, 724 P.2d at 235-38).
53. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 32, 40 P.3d at 456 (citing Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d
505, 511 (Mass. 1975)).
54. Id.
55. Id. 33, 40 P.3d at 456.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing McCauley, 104 N.M. at 527, 724 P.2d at 236).
58. Id. 1 34, 40 P.3d at 456.
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duty owed is not dependent on the level of shareholder control.59 Instead, those
courts have indicated that, because the fiduciary duty arises directly from the nature
of the closely held corporation, the duty applies equally to both majority and
minority shareholders.60 The New Mexico Court of Appeals specifically stated that
"the minority may do equal damage through unscrupulous and improper sharp
dealings with an unsuspecting majority,"'" thereby eliminating the distinction
between majority and minority shareholders in relation to the fiduciary duty.
The New Mexico court then went on to state that several courts have noted the
striking resemblance of the closely held corporation to a partnership. The appellate
court cited the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's formulation of the fiduciary
duty in Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. as the "purest expression" of that duty:
62
Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the
partnership, the trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and manner
of enterprise, and the inherent danger to minority interests in the close
corporation, we hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe one another
substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe one another. In our previous decisions, we have defined the
standard of duty owed by partners to one another as the "utmost good faith and
loyalty." Stockholders in close corporations must discharge their management
and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith
standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in
derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to the corpora-
tion. 3
In several cases following Donohue, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
further refined its concept of the fiduciary duty.' The Massachusetts court's holding
in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. reflected its understanding that "self-
interest is not necessarily synonymous with improper motivation"; as a result, it held
that controlling shareholders in a closely held corporation "should be allowed to
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for their actions., 65 Upon a showing of
a legitimate business purpose by the controlling majority, courts should then
determine if "the practicability of a less harmful alternative" to the minority interest
existed.66 Since this type of "common sense approach" allows the majority to pursue
legitimate business actions while ensuring that minority interests are safeguarded,
it protects both corporate management interests and minority vulnerabilities.67 The
59. Id. The New Mexico court noted that "some courts have explicitly recognized that the duty extends to
minority shareholders in close corporations." Id. (citing Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 863 (Mass. 1988);
A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997)).
60. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 34,40 P.3d at 456.
61. Id. (citing Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 n.17 (Mass. 1975)).
62. Id. 1 35, 40 P.3d at 456.
63. Id. (citing Donohue, 328 N.E.2d at 515).
64. Id. 36, 40 P.3d at 457.
65. Id. (citing Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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Massachusetts court's concern "that 'untempered application of the strict good faith
standard' could unduly hamper corporate management" was thereby alleviated.68
The basic Massachusetts formulation developed in Donohue and Wilkes has been
followed, with slight variation, by several other jurisdictions. 9 For example, in
Fought v. Morris,7° the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the "relationship
between shareholders in close corporations was one of trust and confidence-the
same relationship which prevails in partnerships.' 7 Therefore, the Mississippi court
stated that "majority action must be 'intrinsically fair' to minority interests."72
Similarly, the courts of Minnesota have also recognized the analogy of close
corporations to partnerships in establishing a basis for the existence of fiduciary
duties among shareholders in closely held corporations.73
The New Mexico Court of Appeals chose to embrace the reasoning and approach
employed by the aforementioned jurisdictions.7 4 The court acknowledged the
usefulness in analogizing closely held corporations to partnerships but noted that the
analogy "is incomplete because partners are provided more protection by statute
from freeze-out tactics than corporate shareholders."75 Despite that difference, the
New Mexico court chose to embrace the analogy because it "recognizes the nature
of close corporation organization and, because our [New Mexico] partnership case
law is reasonably well-developed, it provides a ready source of precedent helping
to provide content to the concept of fiduciary duty."76 While noting a reluctance to
specify the elements of the fiduciary duty, because stating "too narrow a definition
of an expansive term would be ossifying, 77 the court placed the duty in the context
of other recognized standards of lawful conduct in order to provide guidance in
future cases with circumstances similar to those in Walta.78
In beginning its discussion of lawful conduct, the appellate court first noted that
"it seems self-evident that a fiduciary duty is inconsistent with the standards of
conduct typically at play in arm's length commercial or business transactions. ' 79 The
court then cited Chief Justice Cardozo: "Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties....Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,
is then the standard of behavior."80
68. Id. (quoting Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663).
69. Id. 37, 40 P.3d at 457.
70. Fought, 543 So. 2d at 171.
71. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 37, 40 P.3d at 457 (citing Fought, 543 So. 2d. at 171).
72. Id.
73. Id. 1 37, 40 P.3d at 457 (citing Berreman v. West Publ'g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000)).
74. Id. 138,40 P.3d at 457. The court specifically noted in a later paragraph that, "while some commentators
would label the approach we adopt as the 'minority view,' our review of case law informs us that it is actually the
prevalent view among those courts which have addressed the issue." Id. 1 42, 40 P.3d at 458.
75. Id. 38,40 P.3d at457. See also NMSA 1978, § 54- IA-401(f),(h)-j) (1997); NMSA 1978, § 54-1A-404
(1996).
76. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 38, 40 P.3d at 457.
77. Id. 39, 40 P.3d at 457 (citing McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 104 N.M. 523,527, 724 P.2d
232, 236 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)).
78. Id.
79. Id. 40, 40 P.3d at 458.
80. Id. (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
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The Walta court held that the duty imposed on shareholders in a closely held
corporation is similar to that owed by directors, officers, and shareholders to the
corporation itself: loyalty, good faith, inherent fairness, and the obligation not to
profit at the expense of the corporation.8 In essence, by aligning itself with the
Massachusetts approach and current New Mexico partnership law, the court chose
to impose a high duty of candor and good faith when majority shareholders are
dealing with minority shareholders.82
In giving content to that duty, the New Mexico Court of Appeals sought to
construct broad guidelines rather than rigid standards of conduct. The court began
by noting that it did not wish to catalog the specifics of the fiduciary duty owed, but
rather sought to place the duty in the context of other recognized standards of lawful
conduct.83 The court's analysis led it to adopt the approach that it felt was most
aligned with longstanding principles of corporate law. This approach protects the
interests of minority shareholders but does not interfere with shareholders' rights to
contract freely. Additionally, it preserves the essential need for managers to make
business decisions without undue judicial interference. Thus, this case sets
manageable, but not intrusive, standards. The court, obviously cognizant of the need
for business entities to conduct business free from judicial interference, provided
limited but valuable guidance to closely held corporations operating in New Mexico.
After giving some content to the rigor of the fiduciary duty, the court went on to
discuss the duty in the areas in which it commonly arises in closely held corpora-
tions: "valuation of the stock, the related matter of disclosure of material facts
relating to corporate officers, and adherence to contractual obligations between
shareholders."'8 With regard to the full disclosure of material facts affecting the
valuation of stock, which has been widely discussed by various courts,85 the majority
of the cases impose a duty that requires full, voluntary disclosure. 6 The duty
requires disclosure beyond mere access to the books and records of the
corporation.87 According to the New Mexico court, the underlying rationale of this
requirement is to equalize the bargaining positions of shareholders where valuation
of stock is typically difficult.88 Thus, the New Mexico rule is as follows:
[A] majority shareholder, as well as an officer or director of such a close
corporation, when purchasing the stock of a minority shareholder, has a
fiduciary obligation to disclose material facts affecting the value of the stock
81. Id. 1 41, 40 P.3d at 458 (citing Dilaconi v. New Cal. Corp., 97 N.M. 782, 788, 643 P.2d 1234, 1240
(N.M. Ct. App. 1982)).
82. Id. 42, 40 P.3d at 458.
83. Id. 39, 40 P.3d at 458.
84. Id. 43, 40 P.3d at 458.
85. See, e.g., Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Van Schaack, 867 P.2d 892, 898 (Colo. 1994); Jordan v. Duff
& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Close corporations buying their own stock, like knowledgeable
insiders of closely held firms buying from outsiders, have a fiduciary duty to disclose material facts."); Walta, 2002-
NMCA-015, 44,40 P.3d at 458.
86. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 44, 40 P.3d at 458.
87. Id. (citing Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd., 867 P.2d at 898-99; Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1200
(7th Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, under New Mexico partnership law, partners, as fiduciaries, are "required to fully
disclose material facts and information relating to partnership affairs to other partners, even if the other partners
have not asked for the information." Fate v. Owens, 2001-NMCA-40, 25, 130 N.M. 503.
88. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 44, 40 P.3d at 458.
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which are known to the purchasing shareholder, officer, or director by virtue of
his position, but not known to the selling shareholder.8 9
The appellate court concluded its primary analysis by noting that, in many cases,
including Walta, a shareholder agreement exists among the members of the closely
held corporation.9° Therefore, the court faced two additional issues: the nature of the
fiduciary duty arising from a shareholder agreement and whether non-compliance
with a shareholder agreement could be deemed to be a breach of the fiduciary duty.9'
In holding that a breach of a shareholder agreement could also constitute a breach
of the majority shareholder's duty, the New Mexico court chose to adopt the
approach taken by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Fought.92 There, the court
reasoned that breach of the agreement could illustrate a departure from the absolute
good faith required of a majority shareholder. 93 The New Mexico court cautioned,
however, that every noncompliance with a shareholder agreement does not
necessarily imply a breach of fiduciary duty.94 The determination of "whether the
breach of fiduciary duty has occurred will normally be a question of fact for the
jury.
95
Finally, the court acknowledged that the fiduciary duty defined in Walta is the
default standard applicable only in the absence of a contrary agreement between
shareholders stating, "shareholders are free to agree to different standards as long
as the essence of right conduct is preserved. 96 In so concluding, the New Mexico
appellate court emphasized the Walta decision as being a default standard, rather
than a conclusive mandate, for New Mexico closely held corporations.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Under the new precedent established in Walta, shareholders in closely held
corporations will have much more guidance as to their rights and duties than they
did prior to the decision in this case. Majority shareholders, when taking action that
significantly impacts minority shareholders, or vice versa, will be under the
obligation of law to act in utmost good faith and fairness with respect to their fellow
shareholders. This is not to say that particular shareholders cannot take action that
may adversely affect other shareholders; they have the freedom to make businessjudgments to that end, so long as they have a legitimate business purpose for doing
so.
89. Id. 1 45, 40 P.3d at 459-60. After defining the fiduciary duty standard, the New Mexico court then
adopted the standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court for what constitutes material information: "An omission
or misstatement is material if there is a 'substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted (or
misstated) fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder."' Id.
(citing TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449).
90. Walta, 2002-NMCA-015, 46, 40 P.3d at 459.
91. Id.
92. ld. U1 46-47, 40 P.3d at 459.
93. Id. 1 46, 40 P.3d at 459.
94. Id. 1 47, 40 P.3d at 459.
95. Id.
96. Id. 1 48, 40 P.3d at 459. In so stating, the court illustrated the longstanding deference given to the
formation of contractual agreements among shareholders.
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Newly formed closely held corporations in New Mexico should now include a
provision in their bylaws that contains the essence of this duty: the requirement that
each shareholder exercise good faith and fairness toward each other in all actions.
Thus, a breach of that agreement could definitively indicate a breach of the general
fiduciary duty.97
However, while the court in Walta sought to equalize the bargaining positions of
shareholders and ensure that their interests are protected by establishing the
fiduciary duty, it specifically noted that the duty stated is merely the default standard
"applicable in the absence of a contrary agreement between shareholders.
Shareholders are free to agree to different standards as long as the essence of right
conduct is preserved."98 Thus, while shareholders are bound to that general standard
of right conduct, they are free to draft shareholder agreements in any number of
ways that do not necessarily correlate with the standard given in Walta. Again, this
preserves the fundamental right to contract freely in a business enterprise.
VI. CONCLUSION
By adopting and explaining the existence of a fiduciary duty for shareholders in
closely held corporations in New Mexico, the New Mexico Court of Appeals set
general guidelines for closely held corporations to follow. As in partnerships,
shareholders in closely held corporations are required to exercise utmost good faith
and loyalty in their dealings with the corporation and other shareholders. That
standard must be met in order for shareholders to escape liability for actions that
negatively impact other shareholders in a closely held corporation. However,
shareholders in closely held corporations still retain the fundamental right to
contract and exercise business judgment. Thus, the rights of both minority and
majority shareholders, and the general standards of conduct established in New
Mexico corporate law, are preserved and protected under the holding of Walta.
97. Id. 46-47,40 P.3d at 459.
98. Id. 48, 40 P.3d at 459.
Winter 2004]
